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Preface

In my:.study of the events culminating in the resignation of Sherman
Adams from the position of Assistant to the President in 1958, I have
endeavored to deal with three factors:
s~udied

the Adams-Goldfine relationship

by the Congressional committee, the politicians' reaction to the

information disclosed there, and the position taken b.Y national publications. I:have-·included a brief statement of Adams 1 earl;y- life and his
duties as

Assistant to the President for

backgroun~,purposes,

but other-

wise, I have brought in material about the man himself or the !!;isenhower
administration only as it relates to the case.
Adams r contacts with the FTC and the SEC w·ere not the only uhes whli.:ch
came to light in the SUil'll!J3r of 1958, but these calls made in Goldfine 1 s
behalf attracted the attention of press and politicians, and these are 1tl!e
ones I·;Ji4'Ve::.d.~alt ldth•.:. ,y.,

In the long run, the other oontacts had

little or no effect on the Governor's* career.
Because of the limited amount of space and time available, I refrained
from

co~aring

the Adams affair with the problmms of some of President

Trwnan 1 s staff members.

Si.Illilarities do exist, and it is not to be inferr~d

from the omission of these from my paper that I consider the Adams case
unique.
In writing the bibliography, I found no entirely satisfactory wq of
listing the periodicals.

Consequently, for the sake of simplicity and clarity,

I chose to list the volumes in which articles cited appeared, and in the
cases of magazines not having volume rnimbers, the approximate dates of the
material used.

* The

title became a nickname for Adams which lasted throughout

his service as A@tti.stant to the President.

2

Chapter I
Introduction: Adams 1 Early Life and Political Career
Sherman Adams, who was to become one of the most controversial figures
in the politics of the 1950(s, was born January ! 1 1899, in East Dover,

Vermont.

1

A member of the }iassachusetts .Adams family, he served in the

United States Marines during World War I and graduated from Dartmouth College
in 1920.

2

After receiving his college~.degree, the young man moved from

Providence, Rhode Island, where he had spent his childhood, to New Hanpshire. 3
H~

entered the lumber business, and held the office of Treasurer of the

Black River Lumber Company in Healdville, Vermont from 1921 to 1923, when
he received a promotion to woods superintendent of Parker-Young Company in
Lincoln, New Hampshire. 4

Thus, in his youth and business career, Adams

developed cozmections idth several states, and in this way gained the outlook of a Nel-l Englander.
Parker•Young Company, attempting to strengthen its business through
political representation, persuaded Adams to enter politics in 1940.

5

He campaigned successfully for election to the New Hanpshire House of Representatives in that year and for reelection in 1942.

6 During his second

term, the~~presentative held the position of Speaker of the House. 7 He
was also active as Chairman of the Republican Committee of Grafton County
in 1942, and as a delegate to the Republican National Convention in 1944,

8

establishing himself as a leader in New Hampshirepp.at:t:y:_.politicsaa.s:;well::J as
a trusted spokesman for the people of his area.
Having gained experience by holding state office, Adams entered national
poll tics in 19l{!l.9

Elected as Congressman from New Hampshire 1 s second

district, the freslunan legislator, along with t.hir;W other young Republicans,
signed a statement declaring that he would follow his own convictions

3
regardless of the position of the conservative Republican leaders.
declaration, made

~ly

10 l'his

in his involvement 'i'lith the party outside New

Hampshire, showed not ohly that Adams intended to follow a course independent of do:m:ination by oj;heD politicians, but also the hostility he felt
for the more 11right-wing 11 members of his own party.
The only setback which Adams ever expenenced at the polls came in

1946, when he lost the Republican nomination for Governor of New Hampshire
to the incumbent Charles H. Dale by 157 votes. 11 After a two year retirement
from public life, during which he returned to the lwnber industry, he sought

2 This two year term saw the reorganization

and won the governoDship in 1948!

of the state government, producing a reduction of the number of departments in the state from eighty-three to forty-three at an annual saving
of about one million dollars. 13

This achievement played a major role in the·

reelection of the Governor in 1950. 14
Turning his attention to business in his second term, Governor Adams
set up the New Hampshire Business Development 6orporation composed of the
industrial leaders of the state.

1

5

By the use of public funds, this organi-

sation sought to aid existing businesses in New Hampshire and to encourage
the establishment of new ones.

16

When the Republican party began U.s searcbffora.appre:Sidentialcc.andidate
for the 1952 election, Adams' impressive record as Governor gave weight

to the opinions he voiced.

He was one of the siX delegates to the tlovernors 1

Conference in Gatlinburg, Tennessee to endorse Dwight ~. Eisenhower for the
Presidency on September 30, 1951.

17

.

This was the beginning of his active

support of the EisenhoWer-for-President movement.
On December 17, 1951, Adams l-~\'tt a letter to Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge telling him that a movement existed in NevT

Hampshire~

place

4
Eisenhower's name in the Republican presidential pr1mar,y.
he himself was working toward this end, Adams informed

18

~dge

ImplYing that
that he needed

a definite statement of the Gene raJ. 1 s political affiliation in order to
satisfy the provisions of New Hampshire law.! 9 . The question arose because
Eisenhower's political preferences were

virtu~

unknown, and the county

clerk of Dickinson County, Kansas, the war hero 1 s home, had stated in response

,

to a letter from the New Hampshire Attorney General in December, 1951, that
the General had never voted in the county.
In a reply to Adams on January

4,

20

1952,

~dge

stated that Eisenhower

had told him in a conversation which took place while the General was
President of Columbia University, that Republicanism was a tradition in his
family, and that he was, in fact, a Republican.

21

General Lucius B. Clay

also had informed Lodge that the \-lorld War II hero had voted Republican
since he had left active military service in 1948.

22

Seeing from~ietter that New Hampshire Republicans were enthusiastic
about the candidacy of Eisenhower, ~dge announced-:P.n January &.,~. 1952, that
he intended to enter Eisenhower 1 s name in the New Hanpshire Republican primary. 23
Lodge had not asked the candidate 1 s consent before he made the move, but
Eisenhower
once the Senator had made the announcement,A- felt compelled to allow his
name to appear on t~ballot in the primary. 24 Although Lodge, not Adams,
actually placed EisenhoWer 1 s name in this first primar,y which would eventually
lead to nomination and election to the presidenqy, the New Hampshire Governor
was a key figure.

His letter indicated to Lodge that Eisenhower would

have the support of the state's recently reelected\~hief ~ecutive, and this
Lodge
must have encouragedl\to proceed with placing the W1IDlm in nomination.
Apparently Eisenhower would have in Adams a strong ally in his first political
test.

5
After Eisenhower officially became a candidate for the nomination,
Adams played a major part in his campaign.

He restated his support of

Eisenhower in a speech before the National Republican Club in New York
City on January 29, 1952, saying that the General was the most qualified
person in the country for the office of President, and the one with the
best chance of winning an election. 25 Adams 1 campaigning in Ne~ Hampshire
led the General to victory in the state's preferential primary in March, 1952.

26

The candidate met his New !iigland supporter for the first time at a
meeting of New Hampshire delegates to the Republican National Convention
on June 91 1952, at Eisenhower's home in Morningside Heights. 27 Adams
continued his service to Eisenhower, acting as his floor manager at the
Republican National Convention. 28 Adams attributed his appointment to this
position primarily to the fact that he was the only Republican leader

identi~

fied neither with Hobert A. Taft, the General's opponent for the nomination
at the convention, nor Thomas DeHey;9 and t6"h±s)~port of the Houston
Manifesto)0 The Manifesto, prompted by attempts in Houston to discredit
Eisenhower delegates by claiming that Democrats had voted in the primaries,
led to the II fair plJY rule, 11 which required tm t delegates be accepted unanimously
by the convention in order to be seated.31

After Eisenhower received the nomination at the Republican Convention,
Herbert Brownell, one of his major advisers, suggested to him that Sherman
Adams be made ,~aignM,anager. 32 When asked on July 22 if he l-Tould accept
the position, the formertloorKamager responded

enthusiastic~,

but indicated

that he needed time to make some arrangements before he could officially
accept. 33 The Governor requested and rece~ved the consent of the New
Hampshire Governor's Council to take a leave of absence from his duties in
the state. 34

6

Thus relieved of his responsibilities in New
to devote himself to the CaJJI.Paign.

~shire,

Adams was able

Throughout the campaign, the nominee 1s

staff had the task of mapping strategy for a candidate who distrusted
politi.cal maneuvering. 35 Adams 1

~e

lnain job was to achie~l~Wbetueen the old
6

conservative Republicans and the more liberal tisenhower supporters.3

Although enough of the difficulties within the party were resolved to enable
Eisenhower to win the election, Adams and the General's other backers could
not reconcile all the hostile party leaders to the candidate.

'lhese men

attempted to block the President's legislative program in Songress once he
took office. 37':::·,Thus, the differences between Adams and some of the Republican
leaders developed while the IYovernor was still Qampaign ~anager for Eisenhawer;:

7

Chapter II
Assistant to the President

After the November, 1952 election, the victorious Dwight
faced the task of choosing his cabinet and staff.
to serve as Assistant to the President,

1

he felt for his former Campaign Manager.

D. Eisenhower

He asked Sherman Adams

an· indication of the high regard

The Governor exhibited some reluc-

tance to accept this position, an attitude which led Eisenhoiver to fear that
his Aide did not attach as much importance to the position as he himself
Adams did accept

t~

~2

position, however, and Eisenhower announced the intended

appointment on November 24. 3
The office of Assistant to the President had existed in the administration of Harry

s.

Truman, but Eisenhower.is Aide wielded more responsibility

and power than had his predecessors.4 Although he coordinated almost all

problems dealing with political or domestic polici, the Assistant was never
delegated the authority or power of the Presidency itsel£.

6

His job

included the settling of small problems within the executive branch of
the government, 7 approving appointments of officials to the federal commissions
and agencies, and the answering of all legitimate inquiries or requests of
th! executive.
approval,

8

When making decisions, the President sought Adams 1 mark of

"0 .K., s.A.

II

on papers brought to him, and i f this signature was

missing, the L1.ief t-xecutive seldom consented to the proposal without further
investigation. 9 A comment by Eisenhower that Adams w-1as lithe one person who
reaJ.ly knows what I am trying to dO 111 0 shows the ~ent of the confidence
the ~ef had in his <Assistant's abilities to do
well.

his administrative work

8

Adams• office was the hub around which \illite House business revolved.

11

In the course of one normal day, he placed thirty telephone calls, and
members of his staff handled 120 calls.

12

The Assistant •s day was filled

with appointments and conferences; in which such topics as the administration1s programs, patronage, and job interviews demanded attention. 13

In addition, he conferred with the President several times and handled
voll.Ulles of paperwork.

1

4 The President's Aide worked efficiently, trying

to insure the orderly functioning of the government while abiding by his

own conviction that a good administrative staff worker should bother the
President as seldom as possible. 15
Adams received pointed criticism as a result of the polrer of his

-

position.

Some Congressmen felt that he prevented them from seeing the

· President,

16 a charge which the assistant explicitly denied, 17 and that
18

his control of appointments violated their prerogative of patronage.

A nl.Ullber of observers suggested that when Governor Adams presented a program
to President Eisenhm-rer, he gave only one side of the picture and left the
President poorly informed on some. issues. 19 At the heart of all these criticisms lay the idea that Sherman Adams ti'as a kind or second President,
hindering the relations of other government officials tdth the chief executive.
In addition to the enemies he made inthe execution of his duties, Adams

alienated others by the abruptness of his personality.

The epitoDzy" of

the stereotyped conception of a New Englander, the Assistant to the President
was thought of as stern, innnensely capable in his work, and completely
upright morally.

20

So strongly did the man feel his own integrity that

he assl.Ulled it was taken for granted by others. 21

Characterized by bluntness,

Adams was noted for putting down the telephone receiver at the conclusion of

9

a call without the courtesy of a good-by.

22

This mixture o~almost unapproach1

able virtue and forbidding abruptness made the New Englander unpopular with
many.

The geniality Adams showed at times in his leisure hours or on social

occasions 23 was virtually unknown to those who associated with him only for
business purposes.
the first Eisehhower administration,
~n.gfo. the 'Presidential ~sistant played fole in a case before the
Securities and Exchange Commission which brought charges of executive
interference .from Capitol Hill.
planning sessions of

1954 to

Tre President decided in his budget

limit the expansion of the Tennessee Valley

Authority by denying TVA the privilege o~anding its facilities to
serve Hemphis, Tennessee and the Atomic Energy Plant at Paduclf. Kentucky.

2

4

Subsequentzy, the Bureau of the Budget and the Atomic Energy Commission
began to negotiate with the Middle South Utilities Company, headed by
Edgar H. Dixon and the Southern Company, of which E. A. Yates was chairman,
for the construction of an electrical plant to supply Memphis and Paducah.

2

5

The project was lmown as Dixon-Yates from the names of the heads of the two
companies involved in it.

26

,,

Before he retired .from the office of Director of the Budget on April

15, 1954,

Joseph Dodge had asked Adolph Wenzell, a retired vice-president

,,

and director of the First Boston Corporation, which helped finance DixonYates, to advise the government on this matter.27
with\D.ixoll"'!"Yat.es-.:.~~o'?Dodg~ Tan~:hi§l

Wenzell ~l.:ain~d.C·~;:;connection

s.1lc:<:!;l:}sor.;.d1.oland Hughes;-:

·.--·~

· ··_.:;, but

the government officials did not consider Wenzell a major consultant in
the project, nor did they think of the possibility that he might be advising
both government and business simultaneously. 28

In August,

1954,

at the

request of President Eisenhower, Hughes and Lewis Strauss, AEC Chairman,
prepared a chronological account of the part of the government in the

10

Dixon-Yates deal. 29 They omitted Wenzell s name from tl].e account altogether,
1

which Adams later interpreted as proof that they thought he was of little
importance. 30
The Democrats in Congress I displeased with the minimization or the operations of 'NA, 31 fo'Wld in the person of Adolph Wenzell a chance to thwart
the administration!s program.

In Febru.ar,y-1 Senator idster Hill

(D-Al3~)

having discovered the involvement of Wenzell in both parts of the negotia-

.

32

tions, asked Hughes what part Wenzell had had in the matter.
Hughes
Ylenzell
,
stated that ~:was ~ government consultant who had been left out of the
report issued in August because he was unimportant, and in order to avoid
controversyl but did not mention his affiliation with the '"flr.sh Boston
Corporation. 33 Hughes' motives for telling a half-truth in this case are
I

unclear, but his failure to divulge Wenzell s true position gave credence
n

to the notion that all was not well with the Dixon-Yates negotiations.
Hill capitalized on Hughes• statement, charging Wenzell with involve-

ment on both

s~des

of the contract and Hughes with

atte~ting

to hide this

fact. 34 Eisenhower, poorl\1 informed, denied that Wenzell had ever advised
the government on Dixon-Yates. 35 When the White House learned the truth,
James Hagerty, the President's press secretary, issued a statement

mmnimizit~

the place of Wenzell in the government's planning.36
On June ll,

19551

in the middle of the furor over the double role of

Adolph Wenzell in Dixon-Yates, Hughes called Sherman Adams to ask him dJ:
he could have the SEC hearings on financing plans for Dixon-Yates postponed
from June 13 in order that the Bureau of the Budget could confer with adviscem
about some of the testimony to be given. 37 Adams arranged for the delay
38
with SEC Chairman Sinclair Armstrong.

11

On Honday, June 131 the day on which Wenzell had been scheduled to
testif,y before the SEC, the House voted favorably on an appropriation

''39

ltl

for transmission lines between the Dixon-Yates plant and TVA facilities.
When

Wen~ell•s

position became lmown1 accusations, primarily by Democrats,

arose in both houses of Congress that Adams had purposely delayed the SEC
hearing at ldlich the adviser would testify" in order to insure the passage
of the appropriation.

Senator Estes Kefauver (D-Tennessee) 1 40 said in

the Senate that Adams apparent],y wanted to conceal information which would
have changed the House decision on the financing of the transmission line. 41
Others, including Senator Jotm Sparkman (D-Alabama), li2 Senator Wayne Morse
(R-oregon),43 and Representatives Charles Price (D-Illinois)44 and Thomas
Abernathy (D-Mississippi)4.5 also criticized Adams• interference.
This assault on the Assistant to the President did not provide the
political capital the Democrats had hoped.

Sensing that the issue was too

complex to stir the public 1 they allowed it to drop. 46 . In the case of
Dixon-Yates, however, the hostile feeling of some Congressmen toward Adams
became vocal.

Another issue was needed to crystallize new animosities and

redirect existing ones into a full-scale attack.

12

Chapter III
The Goldfine Case Begins

On January 27, 1958,

1

the special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight

of the House Committee on Interstate and ~oreign Commerce began its hearings.

;;...

The body, established at the request of Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn,
sought to investigate the regulatory

~gencies

of the federal government to

w~f<..

find out l'rllether or not
been created. 3

th~performing

the functions for which they had

The Congressional agency had held preliminary hearings in

October, 1957. 4 Morgan M. Moulder (D-Mo.) 5 served as chairman of the body, ~
but Oren Harris (D-Ark.lj1 chairman of the full committee, 8 had voting privileges
as an ex-officio member. 9

.

The first days of the hearings indicated that the sessions would not
be quiet and uneventful.
Schwartz, on February 10.

The subcommittee fired its chief counsel, Dr. Bernard
10

The discharged attorney claimed that he was

dismissed because he insisted upon thorough probing into the practices of
some of the. federal agencies. 11

Schwartz publicly declared that he had evidence

that woul.d show that certain public officials, including Adams, had used their
influence in the affairs of the regulatory agencies.

12

After the discharge of Schwartz, Chairman 1-loUJ.der, who had supported
the policies of the counsel, resigned his postl 3 When hearings resumed on

·-·

.

""

~~~~~ 13;

Oren Harris took over as chairman of the investigating body.

1

4

He announced his intention to conduct open and thorough investigations,
staking his political life on the action of the group with the words,
will stand

o~

11

I

fall on the success of this investigation. 111 5 This represented

a change from his statement in an executive session on January 8.

16

At

that time he had reconunended the avoidance of charges of imporpriety because

13

of their political implications and suggested that the hearings proceed on
a general level, looking into the legal aspects of the work of all the
commissions. 17 It is possible that in the time that had elapsed since
he had shurmed careful probings because of the effect they might have on
politics, the Democratic Congressman, who, like all Congressmen, was..,up for
reelection in 1958, reC]!.l.ized that the

~lications

issuing forth from the

investigation might help him and his party.
In April, Harris sent representatives of the subcommittee to Boston to
conduct an open hearing.

18

Information gathered there led to the investiga-

tion of industrialist Bernard Goldfine and his relationship to Sherman Adams.

19

Goidfine-, 1mo came to the United States from R.Issia as a young child in 1897 1 a:>
entered the textile industry at the age of 19.

21

Business prospered, and

in 1958, Goldfine o-vmed textile mills and real estate worth millions of
dollars.

22

Described by friends as a shre1-1d businessman who lacked knowledge

of the details of business and government regulations, 23 Goldfine engaged
in practices contrary to the rulings of the Fl'C and the SEC.
Joseph T. Conlon, an attorney for the subcommittee, testified on June 10
that the East Boston Compazzy-, which was owned by Goldfine, had failed to file
forms required by the SEC for the years 1948-1954. 24 On July 13 1 1955, the
Massachusetts District Federal District Court ordered these reports sent to the
SEC. 25 East Boston filed a set of papers on December 16,

1955,

but these did

not comply with the regulations of the SEC because the data given were inaccurate, and they vrere not certified by an independent accountant.

26

Consequently1 the SEC be gam criminal proceedings against East Boston on
April 2, 1956, charging the company with

cont~t. 27

Three days:.later, the

case was dismi:ssed 1-dth the agreement that East Boston pay a $3,000 fine
to the SEC for civil contempt and that the required papers be filed with

14

the SEC ·within ninety days.

28

On November 18, 1956, the Boston court ruled

that the company had not yet obeyed this order. 29

Consequently, Alw.y.ne

F. Jealous, Mild.Ded Paperman, and Horace and Bernard Goldfine, officers
and directors of East Boston Company were

Francis

x.

judg~ responsible. 30

McLaughlin, another subcommittee attorney, 31 introduced

the records of the Sheraton-Plaza Hotel in Boston. 32 These records had been
subpoenaed because the committee had heard charges that Adams had helped
Goldfine in his difficulties with the FTC in return for gifts and entertainment from Goldfine. 33

The reo&rds of the hotel showed that from November

24, 1955 through l1ey 61 1958, Goldfine had paid eleven separate bills at
the Sheraton amounting to some $1642 for Adams or members of his family. 34
MCLaughlin also reported that Goldfine did not maintain a suite at the Sheraton
on a regular basis.35
Major General Wilton B. Persons, Eisenhower's liaison with eongress,

36

called Adams at a fishing resort where he was vacationing and told him of
the development in the hearing. 37

Adams returned to \'iashington immediately,

and on June 12 he wrote a letter to Oren Harris e:xplaining his association
with Goldfine. 38 Adams did not discuss the reasons for his friendship with
Goldfine with the subcorumittee, and thus the basis of the relationship is
unclear.

Their friendship began while Adams was Speaker of the New

Hampshif~.

House of Representatives when Norris Cotton, then a state legislator, introduced
the two, describing Goldfine to Adams as a successful manufacturer and
an asset to the New England textile industry. 39

While Governor of New Hamp-

shire.) Adams. attended a meeting of Goldfine 1 s employees, to which the industrialist
had also invited the Governors of Massachusetts,

~

and Vermont.

40

1.5

Friendship developed between the t"ro men, and the mutual giving of gifts
expressed the esteem each had for the other.41

Adams claimed that he m d

no interest in Goldfine's business except as it related to the welfare of the
New Englanders it supported.4
infl.uential was well

known~ 3

2

Since Goldfine's fondness for the great and

his interest in Adams is readily understandable.

Goldfine apparently cult:Uiated the friendship, and Adams, who had proved his
interest in business while Governor of New Hampshire considered the indus-

#

trialist an important builder of Nerr England's economy.

Goldfine's geniality

!.; . '

attracted Adams, 45 and the Governor accepted his friend at face value.
In his letter to the committee, Adams stated that his family and ~ldfine 1 s

had been friends for more than fifteen years, and that they had entertained
46
each other in their homes.
According to AdaJJ1S 1 Goldfine had invited him to
stay in his suite at the Sher~on-Plaza whenever he was in Boston, and Adams,
thinking that Goldfine rented the suite continuously, had accepted the hospitality.47

The letter also mentioned that the Adamses had been guests

of the Goldfines at the Mayflower Hotel in Plymouth, Massachusetts in 1957• 4B
Turning in his letter to the calls involving Goldfine's problems with

the regulatory agencies which he had made, Adams related that late in 19.5~
after Goldfine had asked him the purpose of a letter he had received from
the FTC, he had called FTC Chairman Edv;ard F. Howrey and asked if he could
secure this information for Goldfine. 49 Adams sent Goldfine a memorandum
on the subject prepared by Howrey in response to this query.50

About a

month after the issuing of the memorandum, Adams 1 sectetary called the FTC
to find out if the case was still being studied. 51

She learned that it had

been closed two weeks previously following an agreement by Goldfine to
change his labels to conform with the provisions of the

~lool

Labeling Ac.t.5

2

16

In the spring of

1955,

Adams continued, he a.rrapged an appointment for

Goldfine with Howrey, at Goldfine's request_.5J Adams maintained that he in
no t.:ra:y attempted to influence Howrey concerning the matter to be discussed

at the conference, nor did he learn from Goldfine that some time after. the
meeting,

FrO

proceedings against Goldfine's firm led to a cease and desist

order. 54 The industrialist asked him for no favors in this matter, Adams
said. 55
Regarding insinuations by the subcommittee that he had intervened in
Goldfine's behalf in the East Boston Case before the SEC, A4ams
asserted
,,
that he had the President 1 s Special Counsel inquire into this matter to
which Goldfine alluded in conversation.5
with the General Counsel of the

sEe,

6

The

~te

House lavr,rer talked

but he did not mention Adams 1 name,

or make any suggestions pertaining to the disposition of the case.57 Adams
took no action at all after he received the report of the attorney.5

8

This call, which 'was not requested by Goldfine, was the only contact of the
vnrrite House staff with the SEC about Goldfine's affairs.59

Adams concluded

his letter with a strong sentence suggesting that the subcommittee could and
should have acquired this:;_information before it
behavior on his part.
On the

~

public~

i@plied improper

60

that Adams sent his letter to the investigating

against his deeds began in &,ngress.

bo~,

protests

Senator \'layne :Norse, who had switched

his allegiance from the Republican to the Democratic party since his attack

61
on Adams' handling of the DiXon-Yates problem,

said thcrt. he had seen Adams 1

letter, and he felt that as a result of his public admissions, popular
opinion would demand the departure of the Presidential

~de

from public life.

62

This approach indicated clearly not only what Morse believed would happen,
but also what he hoped would acme about, and thus, his statement was a battle

17

cry for antiwAda.m.s partisans to agitate for his dismissal.
Any hope Adams entertained that his letter would explain satis.t'actorily
his part in Goldfine's cases with federal agencies quiekly proved futile.
New hints of Gold.t'ine 1 s gifts to the President's ~ssistant came to light outside of the committee.

On June

14

the New York Post claimed that Goldfine

paid $2400 for an Oriental rug intended for Adams, and rumors circulated in
New England that the industrialist had also given the Governor a vicuna coat

'

worth $700.

63

... __

As a result of the disclosures made up to that-ri.me, Repre-

sentative Peter F. Mack, Jr.

(D.-I~~

a member of the investigating body,

called for Adams 1 immediate resignation.

65

When hearings resumec\on June 16, Oren. Harris. restated the purpose of tlB
{,IJJ

investigation.

He emphasized its intention to determine whether the regu-

latory agencies stayed within the \roundaries provided by law, to recommend
legislation necessar,r to enable the bodies to function efficiently, and to
decide if the Commissions were free from outside influence. 67

The memorandun

'fllrl.ch Edward F. Howrey, FTC Chairman at the time of the Goldfine case before
that body, had written Adams concerning Goldfine 1 s problrhms with the FTC
was placedfn the record.

68

This communication explained that in November,

1953, Einiger 11ills had lodged a complaint against llhrthfield Mills, a
Goldfine firm, ·,

1

charging that Northfield had labeled fabrics

11 90%

wool,

9

1O% vicuna, n when the cloth actually contained nylon fiber. 'P Northfield
to correct all labels they would use in the fu.ure
wote to the wool division of the FTC on November 17, 1953, promisingA in'.~ •
compliance with the provisions of the Wool Products Labeling Act, which required
accurate listing of all the
correspondence, the

different fibers in a

CFTC~'Vl<>oli..Divisiori-.Cbief.;.;r:.

:

L.

fabric.7.~
:.:.•

~

• .: "

After more

had said that i f

the Soldfine firm would promise to correct all its labels, the matter could

18

be settled on a

11

voluntary cooperative basis" without legal action.71;

In testimony before the committee on June 16, Robert

F.

Secrest, Acting

FTC Chairman, ~a explained that the reason the Northfield case was dropped
in 1953 was that there was a general misunderstanding of the Wool Products
Labeling

Act. 7 ~

Manufacturers had thought a

5%

sible in the analysis of non-wool products.Yh

error in labeling was permis-

Because this

misinterpretati~

of the law existed, the FTC atte:rrpted to clarify it by stating that the
descriptions of fiber content had to be

exa~t,

but took no action agruu1st

Northfield and other companies that had unknowinglY violated the law.?$
Secrest further explained that in 1955, Goldfine's Northfield firm was
challenged on its labeling of a particular fabris "90% wool, 10% guanaco. 76
After a study 1 o'Lh~uFT6o:h~aueao-.a complaint and cease and desist orders against
Goldfine texti~ compani~fi,
NoDthfield 1-H.lls, Leganon Woolen Mills, Strathmore Woolen orpg:;atiot~~ Jand
Horace and Bernard Goldfine. 71 An FTC attorney had recommended misdeameanor
proceedings against Bernard Goldfine, but the Commission had overruled this
suggestion.

78 Secrest claimed that the Commission's action against the advice

of its attorney was not unusual, that the evidence did not support misdemeanor
charges, and that by naming Bernard Goldfine explicit:J;.y, the cease and desist
order prohibited his engaging in similar practices elsewhere.qy
Secrest also denied ~ knowledge of the meeting between Goldfine and
8
89
FTC members on April 14, 1955,
t-rhich Adams had admitted arranging, 3
until he saw the records in 1956.

82

Harvey H. Hannah, head of the FI'C Wool

Division, who had attended the 1955 meeting with Goldfine on the guanac:o
pDoblem, said he did not know that Adams had arranged it.

83

Hannah recalled

that after the meeting, Goldfine lR d asked an FTC secretary to get Adams on
the telephone, and the industrialist had told him that he had fared well in
his discussions with the FTC.

8 ~ The Wool chief testified that he had con-

sidered this to be name-dropping on Goldfine's part, and had ignored it as such.

8

~

19

Edvrard Howrey, Fl'C Chairman at the time of the Goldfine cases, said that
Adams called his office asking information on the Northgield Mills case,
and that he had supplied this without consulting anyone else.

00

The

former FTC Chairman conceded that he had received no other calls from Adams
about mislabeling, but asserted that the White House or Congressmen frequently
ca.lled him.f/;(Ji Howrey stated that his policy was to discuss matters related

to the investigatory side of tij.e FTC with anyone who

aske~ and

the quasi-

judicial, where definite legal proceedings were initiated, with no one.SfiJ
At the time Adams called Howrey, the Goldfine case was not a judicial matter.
The witness did not recall talking with Adams 1

sec~etary

and saying that the

case had been closed, but he added that the call probably went through his

office.~
Regarding Adams 1 call to the FTC in 1955, Howrey said he didn •t remember

w~ether Adams or his office called. 92 He asserted that he did not con-

sider Adams' communication to mean he had a special interest in the case.

913

In response to a query by Oren Harris as to why Goldfine had Adams call i f

any citizen could have secured the same information, Howrey said that if
Adams couldn't do what anybody else could, then 11 \'iashington is different from
what I thought it

was.~~

Harris snapped back, nit is different from what

you thought. 93 This retort showed the committee i ~·· chairman 1 s disapproval of
Adams' action and his inclination to make the President's assistant appear
in the worst possible light.
On the same

dJhtte~.,testimony in the subcommittee indicated Adams

1

part

in the Fl'C affairs, subcommittee attorney Z.!cLaughlin presented information

subpoenaed from the Waldorf-Astoria in New

York.~4

The hotel's records showed

that Goldfine had paid a bill of $219.65 for Sherman Adams and his wife

20

Rachel covering February 12-15, 1954. 95

Uoldfine had also entertained the

Adamses at the Hayflol.ver Hotel in Plymouth, Massachusetts in

J~,

19$7,

paying some $262 for the e:x:ecutive and his wife. 96
_.,

The day.'prproceedings had done nothing to relieve the pressure on Adams.
Although his explanation of his communications with the FTC lB.d been upheld,
the chairman of the subcommittee had indicated his disapproval of the .Amsistant 1s
actions even i f they were what Adams said and no more.

He had anticipated

the questions about the bills at the Mayflower Hotel, and had therefore been
able at least to appear to offer that information voluntarily, but this
was not true of the visits he had paid at the vlaldorf-Astoria.

The existence

of undue exertion of influence had not been proved, but the fact that Adams
had at the same time accepted lavish gifts from a ftiend and communicated
with government agencies for him raised serious questions about his morality
or his judgment.
During the day on June 16 and June 17, the pace of CongressionaJ. criticism
of Adams quickened.

Senator Ross Bass (D.-Tenn. )~ placed an editorial from

the Nashville Tennessean in the Record. ·;98'' This p-ticle pointecf>ut that Adams
had great power at the White House and was sometimes virtually in charge, ani
that the

Assist~t

to the President had interfered with government agencies

9

once before, in the Dixon-Yates case. ; 9.

The editor had taken the position

that Adams should be fired, and Bass agreed with this, calling Adams 1 action
a 11 travesty oii honesty and integrity.n 100 The next day, Senator ¥.10rse took
the issue beyond a criticism of a man and asked for the defeat of the tarniShed
administration in the elections of 1958 and 1960.

1

<n

With Adams as their

leader in 195:6, the Republicans had used a corruption in government cappaign

102
theme, and the Democrats now hinted at reversing the charge in the upcoming
election.

The possibility of being a political liability to his party was

L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

21

added to the already heavy personal burden the President's Assistant carried.

22

Chapter IV
Adams' Testimony
Having failed in his first effort to quiet the storm around
felt t"e necessity of making another atte::;pt.
wife and ~ihite House Counsel Gerald ~~iorgan,

1

him~)

Admns

Therefore, accompanied by his
the Governor voluntarily 2

appeared before the subcommittee on June 17 to discuss his relationship with
Bernard Goldfine. J Feeling that the body before v1hich he would appear was
controlled by Democrats who were angry because of a politically-oriented
speech he had made in Minneapolis earlier in the year,4 Adams expected no
sympathy from the

group.5

In a prepared statement, Ad:,ms defined his duty as to assist the President
in whatever ways possible.6 lie had made requests to various commissioners,
but he contended that his motives were honest, and that i f it had been rrrong
7
to do vrhat he had done, he was guilty of an error in judgment.
Turning to his relationship with Bernard Goldfine, Adams said that the
8
exch1:1.nge of gifts was mutual.
He admitted that Goldfine had given him a vicuna
I

coat, which Adams valued at $69, a product of the industry of which the
businessman was proud. 9 Adams 1 estimate of the worth of the coat differed
greatly from the price that had been generally quoted, but the cash value
of the coat was not the reih.l issue at stake.

The industrialist had given

vicuna cloth to the forty-eight state governors in 1955. 10
publicized Oriental rug, Adams said that

Go~dfine

Of the much

had wanted to give it to him,

but because the Governor's New Ha!)lpsl:i:i.:re home v1as too small for the rug, the
two had agreed that the Bostonian would reclaim it when Adams left Washington.
'l'he witness asserted that his friend had told him that he kept a r10tel suite
on a continuing basis, and had invited him to use it whenever this was
12
convenient.
On the other hand, Adams pointed out that his famil~ had given
. t
t h e Goldfines presents, indluding a watc1l and a p1c
ure.13

Regarding his contacts with the SEC and FTC, Eisenhower's. Aide denied

11

23

that he had sought favors for Goldfine

~r1

that his friend had benefited from

his actions. 14 The Governor declared that his conscience was clear. 15
Having heard Goldfine complain of mistreatment by the SEC in 1956 1 Adams had
16 ..-~, ·· · .· · '.·,-·,r
the White House Special Counsel inquire into the matter.
When told bY the
attorney .1ihat his friend had violated SEC regulations, Adams dropped the
matter without informing the industrialist of his inquiry. 17
In the FTC case 1 the connnission 1 s counsel had accused Adams of breaking

rules by divulging the name of the plaintiff,

18

but Adams said he did not

know of the rule, and.EH~wrey 1 s memorandum had not mentioned it. 19 Subcommittee
Counsel Lishman asserted that the fact that Goldfine got information that was

usu~~ barred from the public proved that Adams h~~nfluenced the commis~o
1
sions.

Since the White House 1 s venture into the SEC was small and indirect,

and the FTC took action against Goldfine after Adams' 1~~ call, the contention that Goldfine received special favors from the commissions was untenable

.~(\'\

o~other

grounds.

Arter Adams completed his statement, he submitted to questioning u.Y
.:l-1

subcommittee members.

John J. Flynt, Jr. (D-Ga.) asked Adams if he thought

that actions he performed influenced others simply because he was Assistant
to the President.

~~

The witness

that this was possible, and that that
was a valid point for the body to study. 23 Joseph P. O'Hara
admit~ed

(R-Hinn)~\ne

of the more sympathetic Congressmen·., to Adams, said that. he himself had performed 20,000 services in answer to his constituents• requests in his two
J[ear term, and that Adams was doing the same king of thing.-25 According to

26

O'Hara, if confidential FTC information was divulged, Howrey, not Adams,
f
h
ru1 . 27
. bl 28
who had testified that he was unaware o sue a
e,
was responsl. e.
.

,4

•

In contrast to the moderation of O'Hara, the inquiries of John E. Moss

(D-Calif.) 29 and Chairman Harris were aimed to embarrass the witness. Moss

asked i f the reports that Adams had received gifts from Goldfine other than
those previously mentioned were true, and the presidential assistant listed
some

11 small

mats," and a suit of clothes as presents from his friend.

30

Moss alluded to the bitterness of the 1952 campaign, in which he: and other
Democrats were swamped 1dth criticism because of the behavior ,_. .

<:. - _ "'"-·" ~·

of officials in the Truman administration, s¢ng that the Republicans shouJd
conform to the standards they had sought to iW,pose on the Democrats. 31

In answer to a question from Harris, Adams admitted that he ha1power

to clear appointments of32 and to fire 33 officials of regulatory agencies,
and that Howrey was an appointee of his.34

The Arkansas Representative

questioned whether the power of the executive to dismiss commissioners was
consistent with the independent status of the commissions. 35 Harris • final
question went to the heart of the issue at stake.

He asked Adams if he felt

that, :d:onsidering his friendship with Goldfine, he had acted improperly
in his communications with federal agencies.36

form of self-reproach.

The reply Adams gave took the

He admitted that he and his staff had agreed that they

should so conduct themselves that such a question would never arise. 37

Adams

concluded his appearance without apologies, but admitting that he should
have

exercised more "prudence 11 in the cases under discussion.

38

Throughout the week of turmoil concerning the hearings, President Eisenhower had refrained from <ll'llllllenting.

At his press conference on July 18, how-

ever, he read a statement of his position in the Adams case.

39

Differentiating~

between a gift as an expression of friendship, and a bribe as "evil, 11 the
President said that the people should judge cases of gift giving and receiving
according to the charapter, motives, and subsequent behavior of the recipient.4G
He contended that everyone who knew Adams trusted him thoroughly. 4l Eisenhower
admitted, however, that in leaving his actions open to criticism, his

25

t\ssistant,had been imprudent.

42

Expressing his satisfaction with Adams'

presentation to the subcommittee, and his confidence in him, Eisenhower said,
11

I personally like Governor Adams.

I admire his abilities.

because of his personal and official integrity,

I respect him.

I need him.n43

At the conclusion of his remarks, Eissnhower referred all further questions
to Press .Secretary Hagerty. 44

The~., 11-ess ~ecretary

did attempt to clear up

the charge made by Oren Harris that Adams had illegally given confidential
information from Howrey's memorandum to Goldfine.45

The supposedly secret

part of the cammmication, the ma.m.e of the complaintant, J..aJ ceased to
confidential before Adams sent it to Goldfine,

46

according to FTC Chairman

Howrey, because the memorandum had become public information.47

complaining compaQY, Einiger Mills,

be

ha~or.med Northfield

Also, the

of its action.

48

This, too, destroyed any secret character the note might otherwise have had.49
Thus, the White House sought to remove the stigma of illegality from Adams'
acts, although the charge of imprudence remained.
Adams 1 testimony and Eisenhower 1 s defense of his aide aroused storms
of indignation on Capitol Hill and in the

press~

On June 18 1 Senator

~1orse,

the most outspoken of Adams' Congressional critics, asked for support for a
bill he was sPOnsoring to have all gover.bment

officials, including Congressmen,

making more than $10,000 report on their sources of income.5° He called for
the immediate departure of the Assistant to the President from the government.

51

In direct answer to Eisenhower 1 s statement in support ·of his aide, Morse
52
asseeted that he for one did not trust the honesty of Adams' character.
\

This condemnation was almost unique, as most attacks centered on grounds other
than the moral.

Norse: continued, calling the Eisenhower admini-stration the

most morally corrppt in the country's history. 53

The final blow aimed at the

a.dm:ini.stration that day was an assertion that na President who has made such
a sorry redord in regard to political morality would need this fellow; but. • •

26

t.he American people do not need
~rse

him."54 Obviously, the Adams case was to

an excuse to lash out against the Eisenhower regime rather than a

, matte:e to be oonsidere4n its own merits.
Senator John Williams (R-Del. )55 expressed his views by citing an editorial

.£/1,
from the \'lilmington Journal of June 18.

Williams held that Adams was :morally

upright, and that he 1rould not have allowed gifts to determine his political
acts.57 The Senator did, however, assert that Adams should resign to spare -fJ,e.
8
President embarrassment.5 This interest in the position of the President,
associated with estimates of political expediency1 state+r implied, in an
election year, recurred in the thinking of the Republican politicians.
The press as well as the politicians devoted attention to the imPlications
of the Adams case.

There were suggestions that Adams resign in order to

maintain for the government the high standard of ethics he had

demanded~ 9 and
60 and the

that Adams was a handicap rather than an asset to the govermnent
party.

61

MOst agreed that the Governor ought to leave office, and one

article, bypassing the intermediate step of reconnnending that he resign,
called Adam's departure "a political inevitability.u63
One defense which wa~ffered for the President's assistant revolved
63
around the practices of the chief executive.
The President was known to
accept expensive gifts for his Gettysburg farm, a fact which made it incon6
sistent to criticiae his aide .for receiving presents. 4 The editor, in
summarizing his view, wrote,

11

It is pretty rough to penalize a man for doing

what the boss does.u 65
In startling condemnation of the administration, basing its conclusion

on the similarity of Adams •;Jpresentation to the subcomm:ittee and Nixon 1 s
television address in 1952 explaining the c&paign fund issue, one article
suggested that the President himsel.f wrote the

scripts.~

The plan was to

27

appeal to human sympathy through dignified adrnission of the facts of the
accusation and the simultaneous denial of any wrongdoing.f'f
basically was to

11

The philosophy

concede the charge but finesse the implication. 1168 Feel-

ing that Adc::ms had committed a moral offense, the article 1 s writer predicted
that the case would stey in the headlines until AdL:ms was forced out.

69

Although the basic thesis that Eisenhmver wrote the statements for Adwns
and Nixon is undoc'Llr.lented by the editor, and Adams 1 accounts of the two
episodes give no indication of such involvement on Eisenhov;er 1 s part,
the deeper interpretations of the article have merit.

F

70

Ad8lns and the

President did fail to face the logical consequences of the situation,
seeming to be

o~:>livious

to the fact that in high office, irnprudence is as

undesirable as immorality.

The idea that the press would continue to feature

the proclem of the President 1 s Assistant proved correct, as newspaper and
magazine editors not only reported the facts;; and

the rwnors, but b:r adding

their voices to the crescendo of protest against the Governor, they actually
intensified the difficulties of the situation.

Chapter V
More

Testimo~

and Reaction

The subcommittee continued to study the actions of Eisenhower 1 s
.a: Boston businessman1
right-hand man, and when hearings resumed on June 26, John Fol{,took
the stand.

1

Fox had given the investigating body in Boston information

about the Adams-Goldtine relationship. 2 Although still a millionaire,
he had lost most of the fortune he had accl.nllUlated in gas, railroads,
banking, real estate, and coi11IllUilications investments in the bankruptcy
of the Boston Post, of which he had been publisher. 3 At the time of his
Washington testimony the witness, accused of libel against a Pittsburg
lawyer, was out of jail on $2,500 bond. 4 A discredited and embittered
businessman, he blamed Goldfine for his financial problems.5
Pointing to the nature of the criminal proceedings against Fox and
stating that this same man had accused their client of embezzling in a
Boston Court, Goldfine's attorne,ys requested the committee to hear Fox's
testimony in a closed, executive session, in order to spare the reputation
of Adams• friend from the witness• wild accusations.
denied this application.?

6 The Harris Committee

This decision brought charges of irresponsibility

against the investigating body from Congress and the press.

8

The discredited

tycoon testified that on May 10, 1955, Goldfine told him of his problems
with the

no'

and admitting that he was intentionally violating the law re-

garding labeling of fabrics, said that Adams had told him he would handle
the situation. 9

Later, Gold.:t:inS indicated to P.ox that Adams had settled

the matter. 10 The witness added that the industrialist had also said he had
no worries in his cases before the

~

as long as Adams had influence in

Washington. l l Fox claimed that Goldfine had also informed him that he had

given Adams substantial financial aid when the Governor's children were

in College,

12

1
and that he had bought stocks for his politioian-friend. 3

The next day Fox continued his hearsay--based testimony, quoting
Goldfine as seying he gave all the senators vicuna coats, and that sometime after

J~, 1955

he

h~

purchased a Washington home for

Adams.14

Representative 0 1Hara,- who had previously shown himself sympathetic to
Adams, announced that he had written the President's Aide a letter on
June

25 telling him that Fox would testify that Goldfine had bought stocks

and a home in Washington for

him.l5 The Representative had

with -him a

rep:cy from the Governor, in which he informed the committee that he rented
his house in the Capitol city.

16

Claiming that he and Goldfine had no

common business interests and that the industrialist had never bought stock
for him, the Assistant to the President criticized the investigating body
for allowing Fox· to testify in open court. 17

The letter.·reinforced Adams 1

statements at his first formal press conference the previous day, at which
time he denied all of Fox's charges, calling them "preposterous" and
11

malicious. u18
The final chapter of Fox 1 s wild testimony unfolded on June 30 when

he reported Goldfine's remarks on his SEC problems.

19 The former publisher

admitted .that he had sworn on April 16, 1958 in I1assachusetts District
Court that Goldfine had told him his East Boston Co:mpaey could do what it
wanted to so long as he

nhad

Sberman Adams in his pocket. n

sation supposedly took place about July

5, 1955. 21

20

This conver-

Adams made no attempt

to answer this charge, but Fox had so discredited himself in the eyes of the
press that no defense was needed. 22 ,The Fox testimony did mre damage to
the Harris Committee by raising the question of its responsibility than it
did to the Governor r s reputation.

30

The man around whose financial deaJ.ings the case centered took the
stand at the hearings for the first time on July 2.

23

Goldfine e;,q>lained

that he had received gifts from Governor Adams as well as giving them to

him.

He listed a billfold, a Swiss music box, a clock as a wedding present

£or his son, Solomon, a painting, and a gold watch as items Adams had
given him. 24 He described Fox as ua sick man, n25 and clai.med he had never
asked Adams to help him in his cases before the FTC and SEC.

26

The in-

dustrialist admitted he had asked his friend to make an appointment for
him with FTC Chairman Howrey, but added that he did not tell Adams his
specific problem with the Commission. 27

The telephone call made to the

President's Assistant after the conference with Ho~ resulted £rom the
industrialist's enthusiasm with the outcome of the meeting, and was not
intended to impress federal officials.

28

Goldfine said that he learned in November,

Of his troubles with the SEC,

1955

that the East Boston Company

had been fined $20,000 for contempt. 29 He had mentioned to Adams that the
0oD¥>any was being persecuted by t1:e SEC, but he did not know anything about

Ad.q.mS 1 actions after that. 30 In March, 1956, the SEC had agreed to drop
the unenforceable fine it had imposed and the Company settled the problem
with the Commission with East Boston paying $3,000 to cover the expenses
o£ the case 1

.3

Returning on July 3, Goldfine presented his philosophy of friendship and
gift giving, saying that he regretted embarrassing his friends, but that he

did not lmow it was wrong to have friends among political leaders and to be
generous. 32 This was the only e~lanation the textile manufacturer offered
for his presents to the Assistant to the President.

He claimed that he

had bought the Oriental rug to use in his showroom and that he bad 100rely
loaned it to Adams. 33

The witness also admitted that his company had deducted

the hotel bills paid for Adams from its income tax report, but he said
that i f this did not comply with the law, he could adjust the reports.r4
This admission was important to the subcommittee because it seemed to
indicate that Goldfine considered his hospitality to Adams a business
expense, a charge which he had denied.
The gift- giving of the Boston manufacturer extended to far more
people than the Assistant to the President.

Committee Counsel Lishman

produced a list of thirty-three government employees to whom GOldfine
had given Christmas presents as large as $100.35 This, too, was evidence
to the investigating group of Goldfine 1 s attempts to

11 buy11

official favors.

The attention of the investigators then turned to some $776,000
in certified and bank treasurer 1 s checks purchased by Goldfine from 1941
on. 36 These checks had not been cashed, and Lishman offered a hypothesis
for which he had no proof that they might have been paid to government
officials who could not risk cashing them for fear of jeopardizing their
pcsitions, but who could utilize them for security in their business
ventures. 37 The Congressmen asked Goldfine to reappear to explain the
disposition of these checks. ·He agreed to try, but indicated that he
was not sure he would be able to comply with these requests.

38

During the time Goldfine was testifying, Senator M:>rse again blasted
the Republicans.

This time he levelled his critic ism directly at the

President, blaming Eisenhower for not firing Adams earlier. 39 He read
an editorial by Joseph Alsop in the vlashington Post of July 2, in which
the columnist said that the President himself 1-1as the on:cy person who cotd.d
have rallied Republican leaders to the support of his 4-ssistant, and he
had not attempted to do so. 40 In essence, Adams had the duty of deciding

Mil own future. 41 Despite Eisenhower 1 s devotion to Adams, which Alsop

L _______________________________________________

3.2

attributed to gratitude for the ability with which Adams had served the
President during his illnesses, Alsop maintained that the matter should
be settled one way or the other. 4 2

J.~rse

left no doubt in any-body 1 s

mind as to his opinion of the proper disposition of the affair. 4 3

About this time, the President seemed to show signs of retreat from
his previous firm stand in support of Adams.

At a news conference, a

reporter asked him if he had changed his mind at all about Adams as a
result of Republican demands for his resignation. 44
11 The

Said the President,

statement I made ••• I think about two weeks ago, is no more and no

less an expl!esaion of my convictions at that time. n45 This left room
for speculation that Eisenhower was beginning to waver, and that his
opinion on July 2 might be somewhat different from his Views two weeks
previously.

It seems unlikely, however, that this was the case.

Hagerty

conferred with the President and then released a statement to the effect
that Eisenhower still thought as he had when he made his first defense
of Adams. 46 In light of this fact, the Chief Executive's ambiguous
declaration appears to have been more a verbal slip than a sign of a
lapse in his support for his Aide.
Before its next scheduled hearing, the subcommittee, which had alrea.co/ been accused of irres}?onsibility in its handling of the Fox testimoey,
faced another difficulty.

On July 7 Goldfine's aides discovered Baron

Shacklette, Chief Investigator for the body, listening to conversations
in the industrialist's suite

b,r means of a microphone under the door.47

The Harris Committee called Shacklette before it to discuss the episode.
48
The group condemned his behavior and the investigator resigned.
Thus
the Committee apparently repudiated the u.ntair tactics of its sleuth, but
it was also suggested that Shacklette was an able investigator who would

33

have atte:apted such an unethical practice without at least the tacit consent
.49
of Oren Harris.
This viewpoint is unsubstantiated, but there was at least
no~

a question about the natives of the subcommittee in this cas.$.
50
Goldf;Lne resumed his testimony on July 9,
saying that he paid
hotel bills of about $90 for Adams at the Waldorf-Astoria. in 1954 while his
51
firm had a case pending before the FTC.
Lishman tried to relate the
settlement of the FTC case to the Adams-Goldfine meeting, but the manufacturer
52
claimed there was no connection.
Goldfine also denied Lishman's accusation
that he had been encouraged to try further violations of the ·aool Laoeling

53
Act after Adams had successfully intervened in one case.

He steadfastly

maintained, just as Ad2.llls had, that his friendship for Adams was a personal
rather than a business affair.
In the da.ys that followed, most of the testimony centered
Goldfine's financial dealingso

around

He adraitted paying hotel bills for Senc:.tor

Frederick Payne (R.-Me.); 4 Senator Norris Cotton (R.~N.H.): . and
56
Senator Styles Bridges (R.N.H.)
over a period of time fron 1956 to 1958.5 7
5

He called Fox's charges tlw.t he had bought Adams a house and stocks and that
1158
Adams had promised to help him 11 a contemptible lie.
After conferring
with Llildred Paperman, his secretary, he testified that the gifts he gave
59
Adams had been treated as expenses for tax purposes.
Goildfine refused to cooperate with the Congressmen YThen they questioned
him about the disposition of the checks.
checks which had a total value of about

He failed to account for several
~?89,000,

and refused to answer questions

concerning these, contending that the inquiries were irrelevant to the investi60
gation.
Although nothing could be proved, Goldfine's conduct in relation
to the checks left many with the feeling that he was hiding something,
perhaps even shielding Ad9..t'TIS.

Representative Peter F. Mack, Jr.

tD - nl.),

61

a member of the committee, summed up this feeling by telling

Goldfine that he had let his friend Sherman· Adams down by not answering
the questions asked him. 62 Goldfine 1 s actions, said Mack, :implied that
he was not willing to jeopardize his own reputation to protect anyone,
6
including Adams. 3 This statement gives insight into the importance attached to the industrialist 1 s affairs, regardless of their relationship
to the President's Assistant.
During and a.!ter the Goldfine testimony, many publications turned
their attention to some of the

c·.. · \. ·-

facets of the Adams case.

Although

some editors continued to call the subcommittee irresponsible for hear-

64 others pointed out that closed hearings
6
lend themselves to the spread of rumors. 5 Pleas arose for more ex66

ing Fox Is testimony publicly,

plicit ethical standards to guide officials,

but other writers assert-

ed that the problem of gifts had been blown out of proportion and that
gift giving to public officials should be seen as a human problem unrela-

ted to party affiliation. 67
In the study of issues, Adams himself was not forgotten.

zines still assumed he would ultimately leave the government.

Some maga-

68

One

theory offered to explain the ~ssistant 1 s conduct was that he had originally been elected to the New Hampshire legislature to represent business

interests and had carried this practice over to national politics, where
it was less acceptable. 69 Why Adams failed to realize that his standards
had to adjust to his new situation when others made the change remained
unexplained. 70 The press studied the case from all angles, giving it
little chance to die quietly.
Congressmen again joined in the outcry.

Senator Morse once mre

criticized Adams' behavior. 71 In the House, John Dingell, {D - Mich.),

72

placed in the Record statements which had appeared in newspapers by Republican Senators, state chairmen and candidates, indicating a desire
:bo have Adams out of the government. 73

These condemnations came from

every section of the country except the deep South, 74 where Republicanism was too weak to be a force.

This action on the part of Dingell

illustrates the double use of the news media made by outspoken ...Congressmen.

They gave their statements to the press in order to influence the

subscribers to the newspapers, then entered the articles in the Congressional Record to focus national attention on the problem and their position.

This union of the channels of public information with the parti-

san politicians as.sured that;.the case would be kept before the people
and that the Assistant to the President would have no relief from the

harassing of his critics.

Chapter VI
The Case: Conclusion and Aftermath

The summer of 1958 continued to be a crucial period for both Adams
and Goldfine.

For the industrialist, his testi3ony concerning his friend-

s4ip rr.hth Adams was only the beginning of a series of problems.

Because

of his failure to answer the questions about the checks, he was cited
for conteiTq?t of' Congress. 1

This action brought with it a one year fiail

term, which was suspended, and a $1,000 fine. 2

In 1960, the businessman

served a three month jail term for concealing income tax information,
and a year later a federal court found him guilty of $790,000 in income
tax evasion and sentenced him to serve a year and a day in prison. 3
Tne final setback of his career came men, in 1:t62, with $10,300,000 in
tax claims against him, the former millionaire lost his property and
industries.4 When he died in September, 1967,5 Goldfine was a poor nan,
remembered as the person •mose shady business deals led to tba political
dotmi'all of Shennan Adams.
Adams, whose friendship with Goldfine had turned into a nightmare,
remained on the job through the summer of' 1958.

The Assistant to the

President, who had become virtually irreplaceable after designing the
administrative structure that ran the government while Eisenhower was
ill,

6 lost prestige. No longer did Adams make business calls to and receive

them from Capitol Hill. 7 Meanwhile, his staff members sought graceful
·ways to ease his inevitable departure, and frantic Republicans who faced
the ~sgect pf defeat at the polls because of associaJ.iion with Adams
received assurances from unidentifiable sources that the Aide would be
out before the November election.

8

The Republican state chairmen had shmm themselves to be cool to
Adams in late June vmen, in one poll, thirteen called for his ouster,
twelve said his resignation was not needed, and seventeen offered no
opinion. 9 .The balance at that time rested in the hands of those who had
not made up their minds on the issue.

These seventeen men obviously

would offer Adams· no strong support.

Vice President Nixon had rallied

to the cause of the executive, asking Republican leaders not to act like
"cannibals" in their treatment of a man vmo was experiencing difficulty.

10

The Adana case quickened a trend of non-identification with the administration in the Republican party.

11

The candidates for office in 1958

showed a tendency to run on their own merits or to debate local issues
rather than to point to the man in Washington as

11

their man. 1112

The

conservative element, against which Adcms had battled since his term in
Congress, gained strength in the state organizations •1 3 In essence, the
indiscretion of the Assistant to the President had sharpened the differences
between the factions within his party.
The tension increased as the SWiliiBr progressed.

On August 20, Nixon

informd Eisenhower that Adams 1 presence in the White House handicapped
Republican office seekers, and that most of them were prepared to take
a public stand against him.l4 About the same tine, the President received
a report from New England to the effect that Goldfine's business actiVities
were questionable and that Adams had shown poor judgment in his association with the man. 15 Meade Alcorn, Republican National Chairman, reinforced the Vice President • s assertion and added that some Republic an
contributors md refused to donate funds to the campaign mile Adams
retained his position. 16 In addition, the Republican Congressional

Campaign Committee Chairmen were threatening an open statement against
the President's Aide. 17
The President, l-Tho had not asked for Adams' resignation because he
believed in his assistant's integrity,

18 asked Alcorn to poll the delegates

at the meeting of the Republican National Committee in Chicago on August
26 and 27 to find out their feelings on Adams • retention. 19

The national

party head reported to the President that these people were unanimous
in a belief' that the Governor should leave office. 20
Eisenhower, distressed and angered by the Republicans' "hopelessness"
because of' the investigation's revelations, realized on September 4, after
a conference with Alcorn, that Adams would ult:i.nBtely have to go.

21

Nevertheless, definite action was delayed until after the 1-!ai.ne election
of' September 8 at the request of' Senator Frederick Payne, who sought
reelection. 22

P~e had received gifts from Goldfine, and he felt that

his chance of victory at the polls would be greatly reduced if' Adams was
fired

be~ause of' his association with the industrialist. 23 The election

results

represent~d

final disaster for Adams.

P~e

Not onlY was

defeated,

2
but the Democrats won the Governorship and two seats in Congress. 4
Immediately, Republican Senators Ed Thye of' Minnesota and .Arthur Watkins
of Utah, who were fighting for their offices against difficult opposition,

25

contacted Meade Alcorn and insisted upon Adams• dismissal.
26
On September 16' at Eisenhower Is request,
Nixon and Alcorn visited
Adams, who had been called back from a vacation, and told him that the
party would suffer if' he did not resign. 27
otherwise, 28

Although soxoo 1riters contend

they did not ask him to leave the government,

29

but presented

the facts to him. 30 At this time, the President was confident that his
assistant would decide to resign, and he felt this was

best. 3~ Ad~s

had lost

the support of his chief, and this made it virtually impossible for him to
retain his position.

Confronted w1th this situation) Adams sent Gerald Morgan to Ne-wport
where the President was

st~ng

to find out Eisenhoser's point of view

firsthand. 32 When the White House Counsel confirmed Alcorn's version,
Adams drafted his resignation and gave it to the President. 33

At the in-

sistence of his wife that he give his account of the events which caused
his resignation, 34 Adams appeared on teleVision on September 22 to malta
a public statement. 35

The departing executive told the nation that

he had been vindicated by every responsiblB witness at the hearing, and
that he had been harmed by the wild, unsubstantiated testimony to which
the subcommittee had listened. 36

Declaring himself the Victim of a cam-

paign to embarrass the President, he stated that he was resigning to avoid
hindering Eisenhower 1 s program and hurting his party in the Congressional
election. 37

vlith this, one who had served the President for six years

departed from the Washington scene.
The President accepted Adams' resignation with sadness, praising him
for his service to the goverrunent and reaffirming his faith in him. 38

Nixon

and Alcorn expressed their sorrow and regret at the loss to the government
of Adams' services. 39

The men Who had forced his resignation for political

reasons felt that personally and administratively, the Governor had been
a worthy asset to the White House staff.

The newspapers and magazines

reiterated their previous positions that Adams had acted with extremely
poor judgment in his association with Bernard Goldfire 1
President had

mown

40

and that tale

weakness in his failure to take action on moral grounds. 4l

Adams t resignation was the culmination of a series of events.

He

himself had supplied the excuse for the attack in his ill-advised friendship with Bernard Goldfine, and the politicians had seized the opportunity

to destroy a powerful opponent.

4U

Chapter VII
Conclusions

The 1958 case had consequences both immediate and long-range in scope.
Adams 1 rompartmentalization of the various facets of his life put an end
to his career of public service and prominence.

Although morally inno-

cent, the Assistant to the President had regarded his personal affairs
and his political office as separate, not realizing that to others a
connection l·Tould be apparent.

His blind spot was his failure to realize

that in the American political scheme, all phases of the high official 1 s
life are public property and appearances are as important as reality.
Innacurate estimates of the character of individuals and inability to
sense the people 1 s reaction to circumstances were, in the case of Sherman
Adams, as damaging as grossly unethical behavior \·muld have been.

Tm disagreement as to whether Adams resigned or was fired as a
result of the Goldfine case is one of words rather than of events.

He

decided to leave his position only after the President had indicated that
that would be the best course of action.

Since Eisenhower virtually

forced tre resignation, Adams was spared only the public embarz:a.ssment
of dismissal.
During and after the Adams case, public attention turned to the principle of political ethics.

In JulJj the Senate, disturbed by the diffi-

culties of the Assistant to the President, quickly passed a bill which
1
the House had approved the previous August. a This prohibited officials
from accepting any gift that could be construed as conflict of interest,
from making private commitments concerning their public duties, and from
2
using confidential information for their own ends.
This bill, although

general rather :bhan specific in its form,_.dealt w.i.th the issues which
had confronted

Eisenhower 1 s~ide

and showed the desire of Congress to deal

with an area of public affairs which had been both ambiguous and treacherous.
The events from June through September of 1958 illustrate the compleoc function of one of the most powerful forces on the modern polltical:
scene, the press.

In their dual role of reporter of events and maker of

p1;1bll:ic opinion, the news media influence millions daily.

Through constant

coverag~of the developments~;in the hearings, they underscored the importance
of the Adams case.

Attempts at glossing over the affair could not avail

because the people knew what had happened.
Perhaps moreprucial than the diffusion of the facts was thee ditorial
polidy of . the newspapers and magazines.

By their comments, the publica-

tions actually made public opinion. 'I'through their insistence on Adams 1
resignation, their polls showing

that politicians favored his ouster, and

their statements that his departure was a foregone conclusion, these
organs created a sense of indignation in the people and a desire to see
Adams out of vlashington.

This sentiment expressed itself in the Maine

election and d1dndling financial support of the Republican party.

Fina.Jlr,

the President's Aosistant 1 s decision to appear on television to explain
his reasons f::Dr resigning indicates his realization that the country as
a whole J:a.d reacted to his actions, and that he uould have to use the
communications media to giw them his version of the incident.
Thus, the fall of Shennan Adams resulted from a coalition of powerfUl
falt-ces.

The of;f'icial made a mistake which the Democrats stressed in

committee and to which the Republican politicians reacted vigorously.
The press, in combining relation of the facts and the politicians' views
and adding the opinions of the editors, brought the case to a showdown.
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